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Rosie, Katherine, and Krista are plaintiffs alleging sexual
harassment by coworkers in three different cases.1 Rosie and Mike
had engaged in a consensual relationship that spanned several months
in the year prior to Rosie's sexual harassment allegations. Katherine,
also suing for sexual harassment, frequently participated in joking and
conversations of a sexual nature in the workplace, including
participation in several practical jokes that involved placing sexually
explicit materials in other employees' offices. The third plaintiff,
Krista, was involved in an affair with a married neighbor and had an
abortion several years ago. Should any evidence of each plaintiff's
past sexual conduct be admitted? What guidelines are available to
assist in this determination?
This Comment examines the admissibility of a plaintiff's past
sexual conduct in a sexual harassment case under Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, a rule that specifically addresses this type of evidence.
Part I provides a brief overview of sexual harassment law, while Part
II explains Rule 412 by reviewing the language of the rule, examining
the history of the law, and evaluating the procedure required under
Rule 412. Part III presents recommendations for evaluating evidence
of past sexual behavior, and Part IV reviews cases that have
considered the admissibility and discoverability of a plaintiff's past
sexual conduct.
* J.D., Baylor University School of Law, 1999; B.A., Texas A&M University, 1992. The
author currently is a briefing attorney for Justice James A. Baker of the Texas Supreme Court.
The author thanks Professor Melissa Essary for her assistance in writing this Comment.
1. Because the majority of sexual harassment complainants are women, these
hypotheticals and this article refer to women plaintiffs. See Study Finds Sexual Harassment
Awards from EEOC Doubled from 1992 to 1993, 1994 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at D-9
(May 26, 1994). However, the principles in this article apply equally to male plaintiffs. In 1992,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") reported that nine percent of
those filing sexual harassment complaints were men. See id.; see also Susan Perissinotto
Woodhouse, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: Is It Sex Discrimination Under Title VII?, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1147, 1148 (1996).
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I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT OVERVIEW
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer... to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."2 The Supreme Court, in Meritor
Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,3 confirmed that sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII for both quid pro quo and hostile
environment claims. 4  Quid pro quo harassment occurs when
"submission to or rejection of [unwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature] by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual."5  Hostile environment harassment is
conduct that "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment. ' 6 Prior to the Supreme
Court holding in Meritor and in accordance with Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission guidelines, lower courts had consistently
held that sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII. The
elements of a hostile environment claim are: (1) the employee
belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on the
employee's sex; (4) the harassment was sufficiently pervasive to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.8 In
Meritor, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
3. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
4. Id. at 65, 67.
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1994).
6. Id. § 1604.11(a)(3). See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citing
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64). while the EEOC guidelines contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 are not
binding on the courts, see Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 750 (4th Cir.
1996), the EEOC's descriptions of both quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment were
cited approvingly in Meritor. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. This Comment focuses on hostile
environment claims.
7. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 66. The EEOC guidelines are found in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.
8. See Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 977 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1992). The fifth
element of a hostile environment claim may not apply to a case where the alleged harasser is a
supervisor. The Supreme Court recently decided a case addressing liability for a supervisor's
harassment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Rotan, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2280 (1998).
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harassment claim is that the alleged [conduct was] 'unwelcome."' 9
This "unwelcomeness" requirement has created a great deal of
difficulty for courts and has generated significant criticism.10 In an
attempt to establish that certain conduct was not "unwelcome,"
defendants have sought to admit evidence of a plaintiff's past sexual
behavior. The Meritor Court noted that "it does not follow that a
complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a
matter of law in determining whether he or she found particular
sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is
obviously relevant."11 This is part of the "totality of circumstances"
that may be considered in determining whether harassment
occurred.12  The Court decided Meritor in 1986, and Congress
amended Federal Rule of Evidence 412 in 1994 to limit evidence of a
plaintiff's past behavior in sexual harassment cases.
13
II. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 412
Congress originally enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 412
(known as the Rape Shield Law) in 1978 to bar the admissibility of a
victim's prior sexual history in criminal cases involving sexual
assault. 14 Congress amended Rule 412 in 1994 to limit the use of a
plaintiff's prior sexual history in civil cases in which the plaintiff
claims to be the victim of sexual misconduct.15  The advisory
committee's note indicates that the purpose of extending Rule 412
was to protect plaintiffs in civil suits, and sexual harassment cases in
particular, from invasions of privacy, potential embarrassment, and
sexual stereotyping.
16
9. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
10. See generally Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The "Unwelcome"
Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1558 (1992); Joan S. Weiner,
Note, Understanding Unwelcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for
Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (1997).
11. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
12. See id.
13. The number of sexual harassment cases has greatly increased over the last few years,
with EEOC filings up from 6127 in 1991 to 15,354 in 1996. Likewise, awards under federal law
have nearly quadrupled, from $7.7 million to $27.8 million. See Douglas Robson, Huge Surge of
Sexual-Harassment Cases Hits the Courts, SAN FRANCISCO Bus. TIMES, May 16,1997, at 12A.
14. See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046,
2046 (1978) (codified at FED. R. EVID. 412).
15. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
16. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
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A. Rule 412 in Criminal Cases
Rule 412 provides that, in a criminal proceeding involving sexual
misconduct, evidence of a victim's prior sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition is generally inadmissible with certain exceptions.
17
"Rule 412 reflects the recognition that evidence of the victim's
unchastity is ordinarily of no probative value on the issue of whether
a rape or sexual assault occurred."18 In the criminal context, "past
sexual behavior" includes "all sexual behavior of the victim other
than the conduct at issue in the trial."' 9 A policy behind Rule 412 is
to prevent the accuser "from being put on trial."2° One exception in a
criminal case, however, allows "evidence of specific instances of
sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect to the person
accused . . . to prove consent."' 21 Past conduct is "not relevant to
prove consent if the conduct did not involve the defendant. '2
Commentators have noted other policy reasons behind the exclusion
of a victim's sexual history: (1) juries tend to misuse the evidence by
overvaluing it or drawing impermissible inferences; (2) victims are
deterred from reporting and prosecuting rapes; and (3) sexist
attitudes tend to be reinforced by admitting the evidence.2 3 The same
basic objectives that motivated the drafting of original Rule 412 were
also reasons for the rule's extension to civil cases.
24
B. Amended Rule 412: Extension to Civil Cases
The 1994 amendments to Rule 412 extended protection to
alleged victims of sexual misconduct in civil cases by limiting the
admissibility of the victim's past sexual behavior.21 Amended Rule
412 now provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible.-The following evidence is
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving
17. See FED R. EVID. 41 2 (a), (b).
18. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 412.02[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1998).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 412.02[4].
21. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B).
22. WEINSTEIN, supra note 18, § 412.03[2]. See United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 744
(8th Cir. 1994); Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43,47 (4th Cir. 1981).
23. See Catherine A. O'Neill, Comment, Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of
Evidence: A Proposed Rule, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 219, 224-25.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
25. See FED. R. EVID. 412.
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alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions
(b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged
in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition.
(b) Exceptions. -
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual
behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is
admissible if it is otherwise admissible under [other rules
of evidence] 26 and its probative value substantially
outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair
prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's
reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in
controversy by the alleged victim.
27
Rule 412 creates a presumption of inadmissibility for evidence
regarding a plaintiff's past sexual conduct. The advisory committee
emphasized the three ways in which the Rule 412 test differs from
Rule 403 analysis.28
First, it reverses the usual procedure spelled out in Rule 403 by
shifting the burden to the proponent to demonstrate admissibility
rather than making the opponent justify exclusion of the evidence.
Second, the standard expressed in subdivision (b)(2) is more stringent
than in the original rule; it raises the threshold for admission by
requiring that the probative value of the evidence substantially
outweigh the specified dangers. Finally, the Rule 412 test puts "harm
to the victim" on the scale in addition to prejudice to the parties.2
9
C. Procedure Under Rule 412
Rule 412 provides the following procedure to determine if
evidence of a plaintiff's sexual history is admissible:
26. A discussion of other rules of evidence is beyond the scope of this Comment. Rule 403
(Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time), Rule
404 (Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions; Other Crimes), and Rule
406 (Habit; Routine Practice) are of particular relevance, but will not be explained in this
Comment.
27. FED. R. EvID. 412(a), (b)(2).
28. Rule 403 was the rule most likely to be used to exclude past sexual history in civil cases
prior to the Rule 412 amendments. Rule 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
29. FED. R. EvID. 412 advisory committee's note.
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(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility. -
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b)
must-
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial
specifically describing the evidence and stating the
purpose for which it is offered unless the court, for
good cause requires a different time for filing or
permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged
victim or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's
guardian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must
conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and
parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion,
related papers, and the record of the hearing must be
sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders
otherwise. 3
0
The procedure set forth in Rule 412 does not apply to discovery
of a plaintiff's past sexual conduct, which is governed by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26.31 However, the advisory committee's note
advises the courts to enter appropriate orders during discovery to
protect against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality so
as not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412.32
Failure to follow the proper procedure under subsection (c) may
result in serious consequences. One district court sanctioned a
defendant who failed to place under seal its statement of facts
describing evidence of the plaintiff's sexually explicit conversations
with her coworkers.33 While acknowledging the potential relevance of
the evidence at issue, the court sanctioned the defendant by excluding
the testimony of employees other than the alleged harasser regarding
the plaintiff's workplace conduct. 34 The court noted that the plaintiff
could still "open the door" to the evidence at issue if she testified that
she never engaged in such conduct at work.35 Clearly, a defendant
must follow the procedure under Rule 412 or risk losing the evidence,
even if the heightened standard for admissibility could be satisfied.
30. FED. R. EVID. 412(c).
31. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. Rule 26 provides that "[plarties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action ... [which] appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
32. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EVALUATING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
A PLAINTIFF'S PRIOR SEXUAL CONDUCT
In order to provide more consistent and workable guidelines for
attorneys and judges to evaluate the admissibility of past sexual
conduct, I recommend dividing the conduct at issue into three
categories: (1) nonworkplace conduct; (2) workplace conduct; and (3)
past conduct involving the alleged harasser. The first type of
behavior, nonworkplace conduct, is a plaintiff's behavior in her
personal life outside of work hours. This may include her relationship
with her spouse, prior sexual contact with others, and other private
activities of a sexual nature. A second category, workplace conduct
not involving the alleged harasser, may include sexual behavior with
other employees, participation in sexual joking, and use of vulgar
speech in the workplace. This category may also include prior false
claims of sexual harassment against other individuals. Finally, sexual
conduct involving the alleged harasser may include behavior either in
the workplace or contact outside of work hours such as a prior dating
relationship.
Courts have generally treated the evidence within two of the
three categories with consistency, both before and after amended
Rule 412, although the courts do not categorize the conduct in their
analysis. Generally, nonworkplace behavior of a plaintiff is
inadmissible, 6 and conduct involving the alleged harasser and
plaintiff is admissible.37 The most troublesome and least consistent
type of conduct is workplace behavior that does not involve the
harasser.38 In this category, I propose that the defendant must show a
relationship between the plaintiff's workplace behavior and the
alleged harassment in order to be admissible. Although each type of
conduct must satisfy the requirements of Rule 412, the categorization
may assist in the analysis and will encourage more consistent and
predictable results in determining the admissibility of past sexual
history in civil cases.
IV. SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES ADDRESSING A PLAINTIFF'S
PRIOR SEXUAL CONDUCT
Because the extension of Rule 412 to civil cases has only been in
36. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
37. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
38. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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effect since December 1, 1994, most recorded cases on this issue were
decided prior to the amendments. However, the reasoning employed
by the courts in those cases is helpful in evaluating the admissibility of
evidence in each of the three proposed categories.
A. Nonworkplace Conduct
Courts consistently hold that sexual conduct by the plaintiff that
occurs outside of the workplace generally is not admissible because it
is irrelevant to the issue of whether sexual harassment occurred. 39
"'Sexual behavior' includes all activities, other than those 'intrinsic' to
the alleged misconduct, that involve sexual intercourse or sexual
contact, or that imply such physical conduct."4 Sexual conduct also
includes evidence that has sexual connotations such as "dress, speech,
or life-style. '' 4, Examples of sexual conduct include the use of
contraceptives, 42 abortions,43 the viewing of X-rated movies with a
spouse, 44 and prior dating relationships.45
Prior to the 1994 amendments to Rule 412, courts had generally
excluded and prevented discovery of nonworkplace sexual conduct of
the alleged victim of harassment. The Eighth Circuit held that the
fact that the plaintiff had posed nude for a magazine outside of work
was not admissible because the evidence was not material to the issue
of sexual harassment. 46 An earlier decision in 1983 by a district court
held that the defendant could not discover detailed information about
the plaintiff's past sexual conduct, including the names of any person
with whom she had sexual relations in the past ten years.47  An
Alabama district court held that evidence of the plaintiff being
abused at home by her boyfriend had no bearing on whether she was
sexually harassed at work.48 Similarly, a California court, under a
state rule analogous to Federal Rule 412, 49 held that the trial court
39. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993).
40. Sheffield, 895 F. Supp. at 108 (citing FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note).
41. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
42. See Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93-C-4397, 1995 WL 117886, at *2 (N.D. I11.
Mar. 15, 1995).
43. See Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 22 Cal. App. 4th 397, 411 (1994).
44. See id.
45. See Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 136 (D. Haw. 1996).
46. See Burns, 989 F.2d at 963.
47. See Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 756, 762 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
48. See Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 932 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
49. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1106 (West 1995). California and Iowa are the only two states
to extend "rape shield" protection to civil cases thus far. Compare id., with IOWA CODE ANN. §
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properly excluded evidence of the plaintiff's abortions, prior sexual
conduct with individuals other than the accused harasser, and the
viewing of X-rated movies by the plaintiff and her husband. 0 One
judge distinguished between a plaintiff's sexual behavior and her
"marital" history, holding that "Rule 412 does not give . . . the
authority to exclude evidence of past marriages."1 However, the
court went on to exclude the evidence under other rules of evidence
because the information was irrelevant.52
B. Workplace Conduct
The Supreme Court indicated in Meritor that a plaintiff's
provocative speech and dress at work may be relevant to the
determination of whether the conduct complained of is
"unwelcome."53 However, if the alleged harasser is unaware of the
plaintiff's behavior, the court will probably not admit evidence on
these matters.54
1. Pre-amendment Cases
Cases prior to the extension of Rule 412 recognized the difficulty
in evaluating a plaintiff's sexual history in the workplace. While the
Fourth Circuit noted that a "[p]laintiff's use of foul language or
sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not waive 'her legal
protections against unwelcome harassment,"' the court held that the
plaintiff's workplace conduct was admissible because the behavior
tended to prove that the defendant's conduct was welcome.55
Likewise, a district court held in 1982 that the plaintiff "actively
contributed to the distasteful working environment by her own
profane and sexually suggestive conduct. '56 The Seventh Circuit held
668.15(1) (West Supp. 1997).
50. See Kelly-Zurian, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 411.
51. Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Assocs., No. 93-C-5176, 1995 WL 107170, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 1995).
52. See id. at *2.
53. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69.
54. See Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481,484 (D. Utah 1987).
55. Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709
F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)); see also EEOC v. Grinnell Corp., 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 387,389 (D. Kan. 1993).
56. Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639, 641 (E.D. Mo.
1982). See McLean v. Satellite Tech. Servs., 673 F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (finding
that sexual advances were not unwelcome where plaintiff frequently displayed her body at work
by showing photographs of herself or lifting her clothes).
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in Reed v. Shepard 7 that the plaintiff did not state a claim of sexual
harassment because she willingly participated in workplace conduct




Some post-amendment cases list several considerations when
evaluating a plaintiff's sexual behavior at work including the overall
work environment, the nature of the plaintiff's and defendant's
conduct, and the remoteness in time to the alleged harassment.
These factors assist in the court's analysis and are more useful than a
per se rule of exclusion.
One theme throughout the cases is that a plaintiff does not waive
her right to be free from sexual harassment by engaging in vulgar
behavior, but the nature of her behavior considered in the totality of
the circumstances is determinative of its relevance. In Balletti v. Sun-
Sentinel Co.,59 a district court stated that
[plaintiff's] crude and vulgar behavior [in the workplace] far
exceeded any matters of which she complained. Her behavior here
is fatal to her claims. These are not the actions of an employee who
subjectively perceives her work environment to be abusive or of one
who seeks to convey to her co-workers that their behaviors are
unwelcome.60
One example of past behavior that receives somewhat different
treatment is prior false claims of harassment by the plaintiff. The
Rule 412 advisory committee's note specifically addresses prior false
sexual harassment claims by the plaintiff, stating that Rule 412 would
not exclude that evidence.
6'
To show a relationship between the plaintiff's sexual history and
the harassment, the defendant's conduct must be similar to the
plaintiff's behavior at issue. For example, if a plaintiff engaged in
sexually explicit conversations with coworkers and then later
complains of sexual innuendo at the workplace, her conduct is
relevant. However, a plaintiff's participation in vulgar speech may
not be related to a coworker's attempt to touch the plaintiff. The
57. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 486-487.
59. 909 F. Supp. 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
60. Id. at 1548. But see Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1306, 1309 (W.D.
Mo. 1995) (noting that participation in a crude work environment "does not invite or sanction,
and certainly does not legalize, a hostile and abusive work environment").
61. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
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inquiry should involve an examination of the entire work
environment, the nature of the plaintiff's participatory conduct, and
the nature of the alleged harassment. 62  Further, if the accused
harasser was unaware of the plaintiff's conduct, a relationship
between the harassment and the behavior is unlikely. 63
C. Conduct Between the Alleged Harasser and the Plaintiff
Because prior sexual conduct between the plaintiff and the
alleged harasser may relate to the determination of welcomeness, this
type of conduct is generally discoverable and may be admissible. 64 In
a hostile environment case, it is not sufficient that the behavior is
inappropriate for the workplace; the employee must also perceive the
conduct as abusive and offensive. 65 In the 1982 case of Reichman v.
Bureau of Affirmative Action,66 the court admitted evidence of the
plaintiff's "flirtatious" behavior with the alleged harasser, such as her
complimenting his appearance, acting provocatively around the
alleged harasser, and behaving unprofessionally. 67  The court
determined that the manager's advances were not unwelcome. 68
Clearly, the fact that the plaintiff engaged in a consensual relationship
with the alleged harasser at one time does not foreclose the possibility
that the conduct became unwelcome and rose to the level of sexual
harassment at a later time.69
Prior consensual sexual contact between the alleged harasser and
the plaintiff can change the focus of the inquiry. One court held that
when a prior consensual relationship with a coworker ended, and the
employee was subsequently fired following the coworker's negative
62. See Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div., 32 F.3d 1007, 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that plaintiff's lack of power and isolation in the male-dominated workplace must be considered
in determining whether her use of foul language demonstrated that coworker's sexual language
was unwelcome); see also Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d 1271, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989)
(stating that plaintiff's limited sexual comments as "replies to an onslaught of sexual remarks
and gestures" did not establish as a matter of law that her coworkers' sexual behavior was
welcome).
63. See Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 484.
64. See Bigoni v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 732, 734 (D. Or.
1988); Evans v. Mail Handlers, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 634, 637 (D.D.C. 1983).
65. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
66. 536 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
67. Id. at 1164.
68. See id. at 1177. But see Otis v. Wyse, No. 93-2349-KHV, 1994 WL 566943, at *8 n.4 (D.
Kan. Aug. 24, 1994) (holding that two incidents, one in which the plaintiff authored a parody on
birth control, and another in which she commented on the alleged harasser's penis size, did not
preclude the plaintiff from establishing a hostile work environment).
69. See generally Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995).
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comments to her supervisor, a presumption was created that the
employer acted because of the failed relationship rather than on the
illegal basis of gender.70 The plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption
because she did not show that the employer made further sexual
demands and punished her for refusing to continue the relationship. 71
However, a plaintiff's allegation that her supervisor threatened to
destroy her career and issued a disciplinary letter following her
refusal to continue the relationship raised an inference that the
employee was harassed. 72
D. Effect on Discovery
Rule 412 is concerned with the admissibility of evidence, but that
logically will have some effect on discovery allowed in the suit. The
advisory committee suggested that courts should presumptively issue
protective orders and confidentiality orders in cases that implicate
Rule 412 in order to preserve the rationale of the rule.73 However,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 governs discovery, and the
procedures of Rule 412 do not apply to that stage of the litigation.7 4
1. Plaintiff's Conduct
Courts have limited discovery of a plaintiff's conduct using the
rationale of Rule 412. A district court addressed the impact of Rule
412 on discovery in a sexual harassment case in Sanchez v. Zabihi.75
The defendant in Sanchez alleged that the plaintiff was the sexual
aggressor, and asked in an interrogatory for information about
"personal, romantic, or sexual advances" that the plaintiff had made
towards other employees in the last ten years.76 The court noted the
importance of not undermining Rule 412 in discovery and placed
limits on the defendant's interrogatories. 7 Finding the interrogatory
70. See Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High Sch. Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp. 862, 869 (N.D. I11.
1989).
71. See id.
72. See Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Shrout v. Black
Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 779-80 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that the plaintiff was subject to
harassment although she and the defendant had engaged in a consensual relationship several
years earlier). But see Sardigal v. St. Louis Nat'l Stockyards Co., 42 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 497, 502 (S.D. I11. 1986).
73. See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
74. See sources cited supra note 31.
75. 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 835 (D.N.M. 1996).
76. Id. at 835.
77. See id.
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to be overly broad, the court limited the inquiry to the three years
prior to the alleged harassment, and held that the plaintiff was not
required to answer "about any matter involving the coworker who
later became her spouse.
'7 8
2. Plaintiff's Claims
Despite the protections of Rule 412, specific claims by the
plaintiff may open the door to discovery of workplace conduct that is
not between the accused harasser and the plaintiff. For example, the
court in Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc.79 held that the trial court
properly allowed discovery into the plaintiff's relationship with her
former manager. 80 In that case, the plaintiff claimed that she was
sexually harassed by rumors of an affair with that manager as well as
insinuations that she received preferential treatment as a result.
81
Those claims made discovery into her actual relationship with the
manager relevant.82
A plaintiff's claims of mental anguish, emotional damages, or
assertion of pendent state law claims of intentional infliction of
emotional distress may expand the type of evidence that is
discoverable and admissible. Courts may allow a broader
examination of the plaintiff's personal life to determine if other
factors caused or contributed to the emotional distress. 83 Merely
filing a sexual harassment claim does not automatically place mental
condition in controversy.84  One author opined that because
"plaintiffs will now routinely seek compensatory damages under Title
VII, courts most likely will permit expanded discovery by the
defendant, particularly to allow the defendant to discover the precise
cause of any alleged emotional distress." 85  A defendant seeking
78. Id. at 837.
79. 79 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1996).
80. Id. at 1002-03.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Marshall v. Nelson Elec., 766 F. Supp. 1018, 1035 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (holding that
plaintiff's emotional distress was not caused by workplace conduct, but was a result of spousal
abuse, among other things), affd, 999 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1993); cf. Bridges v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 850 F. Supp. 216, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that questions about sexual history are
unrelated to the question of mental anguish and therefore not permitted), and FED R. Civ. P.
35(a).
84. See Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., 164 F.R.D. 204, 210 (N.D. Tex. 1996).
85. CONrEMPORARY ISSUES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.2.2, at 14 (Bruno
Stein ed., 1996). See Alberts v. Wickes Lumber Co., No. 93-C-4397, 1995 WL 117886, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1995) (holding that the plaintiff could not claim the protection of Rule 412 to
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evidence concerning other potential sources of emotional distress
should be distinguished from the argument that a plaintiff who has




Another possible impact on discovery is Rule 412's effect on
nonparty witnesses. In Burger v. Litton Industries, Inc. ,87 the district
court granted plaintiff's motion in limine to prevent the defendant
from questioning a nonparty witness, who claimed to have also been
harassed by the same manager, about her alleged consensual sexual
conduct with employees other than the alleged harasser. 8 The court
cited the advisory committee's statement that Rule 412 applies
"without regard to whether the alleged victim or person accused is a
party to the litigation. '89 The court held that the information sought
did not "substantially outweigh" the invasion of the witness' privacy. 9°
However, another district court denied the application of Rule 412
sought by the plaintiff because the nonparty witness had raised no
objections to discovery and did not seek protection under Rule 412. 91
CONCLUSION
While courts have treated evidence of a plaintiff's past sexual
conduct with some consistency, categorizing the evidence in question
will assist in the analysis and ensure greater consistency in decision-
making. The plaintiff's nonworkplace conduct is generally not
relevant and therefore not admissible. Past sexual conduct between
the plaintiff and the alleged harasser is ordinarily discoverable and
admissible; however, a past consensual relationship does not preclude
a finding of sexual harassment. Finally, a plaintiff's sexual conduct at
work that is not directed at the harasser should only be admitted if
there is some relationship between the conduct and the harassment.
prohibit the defendant's questioning of her inability to engage in intimate relationships after the
plaintiff raised that issue); see also Ramirez v. Nabil's, Inc., No. CIV.A.94-2396-GTV, 1995 WL
609415, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995).
86. See Mitchell, 116 F.R.D. at 485; see also Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, 27
F.3d 1316, 1326-27 (8th Cir. 1994).
87. No. 91-CIV.-0918-(WK)-(AJP), 1995 WL 476712, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 1995).
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id. (citing Rule 412 advisory committee's note).
90. See id.
91. See Stalnaker v. Kmart Corp., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 707 (D. Kan. 1996).
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Returning to the hypotheticals at the beginning of the Comment, the
likely result is as follows. Krista's affair and abortion will not be
admissible in her sexual harassment suit. Rosie's prior consensual
relationship with the accused coworker will likely be admissible. And
Katherine's inappropriate workplace behavior should only be
admitted if the harasser knew of the plaintiff's behavior prior to his
conduct, and if there is some relationship between his behavior and
her actions. With proper analysis and application, Rule 412 can
provide protection to the plaintiff throughout the lawsuit while
allowing the alleged harasser to present a full defense.

